Shifting Global Response to Tehran's Nuclear Program
Intelligence assessments from late 2024 and early 2025 indicate that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had been evaluating strike options against Iranian nuclear sites following the steady deterioration of the regime’s air defense systems over the past year. In response to the regime’s advancing nuclear program and regional destabilization efforts, President Trump has reinstated a maximum pressure strategy aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and reconstituting its proxy network. His position has been reinforced by key lawmakers and foreign allies, who have mobilized resources to uphold non-proliferation efforts. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has since documented a sharp increase in Iran’s uranium enrichment levels, significantly reducing the regime’s breakout time to a functional nuclear weapon. As tensions escalate, Western nations are increasingly aligning around a more aggressive posture to counter the threat posed by the Islamic Republic.
The Bottom Line
According to U.S. intelligence reports from late 2024 and early 2025, Israel is reportedly “considering significant strikes on Iranian nuclear sites this year,” and believes President Trump is more likely to support a potential strike package than President Biden was.
In November 2024, the Israeli Air Force launched several strikes across the Islamic Republic, with one of these strikes targeting the Parchin Military Complex. Reports indicate that the IDF completely destroyed the Taleghan-2 research building, which was revealed to be a secret nuclear research facility.
On February 4, 2025, President Trump issued the National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM-2), reimplementing maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran to prevent the regime from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Several key foreign officials as well as prominent lawmakers in the United States have united behind President Trump's rhetoric on exerting pressure on the regime as a response to its regional aggression and nuclear ambitions.
Islamic Republic officials have publicly vocalized their support for assembling a nuclear weapon and for the removal of the legal limitations forbidding them to do so.
Policy Coherence & International Responses
As Israel has substantially weakened the military capabilities of the Islamic Republic and its proxies, a strategic window has emerged, aligning the interests of those on both sides of the nuclear deal debate. The growing urgency of preventing a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic is increasingly shifting the risk calculus surrounding a first strike.
The Islamic Republic is in a precarious position following the systematic destruction of its proxy network by the United States and Israel, compounded by the fall of Bashar al-Assad, one of its last remaining state allies, in Syria. Simultaneously, theeliminationofkey Hezbollah (Hassan Nasrallah) and Hamas (Ismael Haniyeh and Yahyar Sinwar) have left the so-called Axis in a state of disarray and strategic collapse.
The National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM-2) reimposed a maximum pressure campaign on the regime in Iran to curtail their efforts to create a nuclear weapons system and expand their network of terrorist proxies.
NSPM-2 establishes that:
Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles;
Iran’s terrorist network should be neutralized; and
Iran’s aggressive development of missiles, as well as other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, should be countered.
In January 2025, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz spoke with Senior Director for Counterterrorism Sebastian Gorka and echoed Senator Graham’s language regarding Iran’s nuclear program, saying, “Sometimes, you've got to punch the bully in the mouth and then, take a step back and watch everything settle down.”
Trump utilized similar rhetoric throughout his campaign trail, emphasizing in early October that Iranian nuclear sites were “the thing you want to hit, right…hit the nuclear first and worry about the rest later.”
In August 2024, Senator Lindsey Graham introduced an Authorized Use of Military Force (AUMF) to specifically target Iran’s nuclear sites. With then-Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ben Cardin (D-MD) corroborating that the United States “cannot tolerate” Iran having a nuclear weapon.
Western governments are moving toward a more unified stance on the Iranian nuclear threat, reflecting a shift from reactive diplomacy to discussions of preemptive measures
On January 20, 2025, a European diplomat stated that Israel had already agreed to strike Iranian nuclear research sites
On January 6, 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron reinforced U.S. and Canadian concerns, acknowledging that Iran’s nuclear advancements pose a direct security threat to France and warning, “The acceleration of the nuclear program leads us nearly to the point of no return.”
On December 9, 2024, The P3 (Germany, UK, and France) publicly condemned the regime for “significantly” expanding its nuclear program and increasing the rate of production of enriched uranium-235 while also utilizing more centrifuges than in the past.
In October 2024, Canadian opposition leader Pierre Poilievre publicly stated, “If Israel were to stop that genocidal, theocratic, unstable government from acquiring nuclear weapons, it would be a gift by the Jewish state to humanity.”
President Trump was presented options for striking Iran several times during his first presidency, and in January 2020 he approved an airstrike to eliminate IRGC leader Qassem Soleimani.
After Soleimani's death and an IAEA report that discovered the regime had been storing 12 times more enriched uranium than the deal allowed, Trump was reported to have requested for strike options on Iran’s nuclear stockpile and research facilities.
In June 2019, the IRGC shot-down an RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV. President Trump tweeted that he was “cocked & loaded”, but the United States halted strike packages on IRGC targets with USAF aircraft already in the air.
Recent Rhetoric From U.S. Officials Regarding Military Strikes on Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Biden's Missteps and a Maligned Regime
In December, former NSA Sullivan briefed former President Biden on the rapid deterioration of the Islamic Republic’s strategic air defense capabilities and weakening of its “Axis of Resistance” network, critical indicators of the regime’s growing vulnerabilities and a potential window for targeting sensitive sites.
This followed a significant Israeli Air Force operation in October 2024, in which Israeli jets successfully infiltrated Iranian airspace and destroyed regime air-defense assets, including the Russian produced S-300 system, in October 2024.
That same period saw a notable shift in the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric on its nuclear program. Sullivan underscored this change, pointing to statements from regime officials that hinted at potential adjustments to their nuclear doctrine, stating, “You can look at the public statements of Iranian officials, which have changed in the last few months as they have been dealt these strategic blows, to raise the question: Do we have to change our doctrine at some point? The fact that that's coming out publicly is something that has to be looked at extremely carefully”
The November 2024 IAEA report on the verification and monitoring of the Iranian nuclear program revealed greater insight into the regime's growing effort to advance its nuclear program toward actually obtaining a nuclear weapon.
The report showed that the Islamic Republic’s overall enriched stockpile had increased 852.6kg in a year, with the 60% enriched uranium increasing from 128.3kg in 2023 to 182.3kg in 2024; this is just a short, technical step away from weapons-grade levels of 90%. Similar increases are seen in the 20% and 2% enrichment level stockpiles, with total enriched uranium reaching 6604.4kg in all chemical forms.
The report also highlighted the rapid installation and operation of advanced centrifuges that is responsible for the increased enrichment stockpiles reported on by the IAEA. On November 13 2023, the regime had installed 6,278 advanced centrifuges; that number had increased to 11,731 by November 2024, coinciding with the development of the new centrifuges like the IR-6/6s and IR-2M.
The IAEA censured the Islamic Republic in November 2024 for failing to adhere to predetermined guidelines and monitoring practices; with the agency's board voting 19 to 3 in favor of censure.
IAEA Director General Rafeal Grossi stated, “The philosophy of the original accord with Iran can be used, but that agreement is no longer useful…they developed much stronger capabilities, practically at the same level as nuclear armed states”
In response, the Islamic Republic went into rapprochement withEuropean powers, seeking to make a deal and address the West's concerns; with the Iranian Foreign Ministry calling French President Emmanuel Macron's comments “unconstructive” and “untrue,” pushing the blame on France for failure of the JCPOA.
This type of political theatre is a common tactic employed by the regime to be perceived as a rational and willing actor that will conform to the rules based international order.
In January 2025, Richard Nephew, the Deputy Special Envoy for Iran for the first two years of the Biden administration who left his position due to disagreements over negotiations on a new nuclear deal, explained the potential necessity of military strikes in a Foreign Affairsessay. On X, he subsequently wrote, “...If my choices are accepting Iranian nuclear weapons possession and military action with a low chance of success, I’m prepared to support military action.”
In the Spring of 2024, several IRI officials voiced their ambitions to pursue a nuclear weapon as a means of ensuring the survival of the Islamic Republic. This culminated in 40 members of the Majles (parliament) sending a letter to the Supreme National Security Council in early May 2024 to reverse the fatwa which forbids the acquisition of a nuclear weapon.
On October 18, 2024, a Member of the Cultural Committee, Hojjatoleslam Hassanali Akhlaqi Amiri highlighted the Islamic Republic’s need to strengthen its national defense doctrine due to the west’s “lack of control” over the “Zionist” state.
Also on October 18, 2024, ranking member of the National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, corroborated Amiri’s rhetoric and vocalized his support of a withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Recommendations
1. Strengthen International Coordination and Targeted Disruptions
Expand intelligence-sharing mechanisms with Israel, NATO allies, and regional partners to track and intercept the regime’s illicit procurement of nuclear materials and advanced centrifuges.
Intensify cyber operations to disrupt the Islamic Republic's nuclear research and development, including targeting the regime’s clandestine procurement networks, command-and-control systems, and data infrastructure.
3. Expand Security and Deterrence Measures with Regional Allies
Conduct joint military exercises with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, simulating scenarios where Tehran escalates nuclear aggression or retaliates with asymmetric warfare.
Deploy additional U.S. air and missile defense assets to deter Islamic Republic counterattacks on American and allied forces in response to increased pressure.
Establish a rapid-response coalition, including Israel and regional partners, to counter regime-backed militias and asymmetric threats in the event of escalatory retaliation.
Enhance coordination with the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to ensure precision in any potential strikes on nuclear sites, minimizing collateral damage while maximizing operational success.
4. Reinforce Economic and Diplomatic Pressure on the Regime
Fully enforce secondary sanctions on entities facilitating the regime’s energy exports and nuclear procurement, ensuring Tehran is unable to use alternative financial channels to bypass restrictions.
Strengthen coordination with European partners to push for snapback sanctions.
Leverage diplomatic pressure on nations still engaging in economic cooperation with Tehran, particularly China and Russia, to curtail their support for the regime’s nuclear program.
Image courtesy of the IIPA